Se é que tal criatura existe…(sinalização)

Observing monkeys biting each other, Bateson remarked that they were “engaged in an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to but not the same as those of combat” (1955/1972a, p. 152; emphasis added). That is, to a casual observer or a poorly socialized monkey (if there were such a creature), the same actions might be taken as either fight- ing or playing. Bateson reasoned that the monkeys must have some way of signaling to each other—some form of “meta-communication”—that enabled them to discern which of the two modes was afoot. They were, in other words, “framing” their actions to signal either fight-biting or play-biting. [VAN HULST, M.; YANOW, D. From Policy “Frames” to “Framing”. The American Review of Public Administration, v. 46, n. 1, p. 92–112, 2014]

Ah, macaquinhos…

educação · irracionalidade racional · microeconomia · sinalização

Educação, sinalização e a resposta de Caplan a Kling

Outro dia eu coloquei aqui um link para o post  do Arnold Kling para Caplan, no qual se perguntava a este último sobre educação, sinalização e a famosa irracionalidade racional. Eis a resposta do Caplan. Reproduzo, abaixo, parte do texto:

1. Steve Miller and I have a paper where we examine the extent to which the tendency of education to “make people think like economists” is actually a disguised effect of IQ. We find that at least one-third of the apparent effect of education should actually be attributed to IQ. So while there is something to Arnold’s concerns, there is still plenty of room for education to matter.

2. You might object that it will be extremely costly to significantly raise the average education levels of people with average or lower IQ. I’m sympathetic, but this ignores a cheaper, more realistic alternative: Revising the curriculum to emphasize subjects, like economics, with large political externalities.

3. Just because education is largely signaling, it does not follow that students are not learning anything! The point, rather, is that students are not learning job skills. I don’t deny that students learn history in school; I just deny that knowledge of history makes people (historians aside) into measurably better workers.

Ok, é o bastante para este tema.

irracionalidade racional · microeconomia · sinalização

Educação e os eleitores irracionais

Arnold Kling fala sobre as idéias de Caplan:

…so Bryan’s latest book is on stupid voters. One solution is to educate them. But his next to-be-written book, on education, says that education is merely a signal of ability. The data on GRE scores arguably validates that.

In any case, how can you believe on the one hand that education is merely a signal and on the other hand believe that education can produce more rational voters? Won’t people’s rationality as voters (or, more accurately, their willingness to vote in ways that Bryan or I would consider rational) depend on ability alone?

Eis uma boa pergunta. Se o que importa é a irracionalidade racional dos eleitores e se a educação é um sinal apenas (aquela idéia de que o sujeito coleciona diplomas mas apenas para enviar um sinal de que é bom, não necessariamente o sendo), então os efeitos deletérios da irracionalidade, em nível de ação coletiva, provavelmente não desaparecerão tão rapidamente quanto desejado.

Educação enquanto sinalização é um dos tópicos mais interessantes da economia. A irracionalidade racional, por sua vez, promete. Mas é necessário que tenhamos mais trabalhos empíricos que atestem sua aderência com alguns fenômenos da realidade.