Interessante reflexão, algo coasiana, sobre o conceito de “Giri” (uma característica da sociedade japonesa) e o uso da justiça. Giri diz respeito à obrigação social de retornar presentes recebidos com outros de valor nunca inferior, o que pode bem gerar uma espiral de presentes trocados…
De qualquer forma, fiquei curioso quanto ao estudo citado no final do parágrafo que parece concluir que o “Giri” seria uma forma de instituição informal substituta da justiça formal, um tema que volta e meia retorna a este blog…
Nowadays the “Giri” concept is still prevalent in Japanese customs. Gifts in special occasions are very common, and when you receive something it is almost an obligation to give something back in return that has a similar value. This is common sense in any other culture, but in Japan the amount of gifts that you receive can be really absurd. There was some study that concluded that in Japan the money spent on gifts is the same that the amount spent on justice in the USA. At the same time Japan is the country in the developed world that spends less money per person in justice. It turns out that the “Giri” helps in a certain way to maintain harmony so that Japanese people don’t tend to confront with each other in law courts.
Trecho interessante, não?
How does giri affect the settlement of disputes? There is a definite effect. In the event that parties under giri should fall into a dispute then they will adopt a conciliatory and flexible concessionaire approach. The presence of giri might be incompatible with the nature of litigation and operate to inhibit a resort to legal resolution of disputes.
In managing disputes where the parties interact under giri there will be an effort to consent and to act spontaneously rather than to force agreement. This has led to a large gap between the expectations of legal codes and the daily reality, which results from numerous compromises based on human relationship considerations (Inako 1981, 131-45). It may seem strange, but in disputes law, lawyers and the courts do not seem to have a primary role and are actively avoided in giri situations. In Japanese disputes there is an emphasis on such mentality as “sincerity” (sei-i) rather than on “rights” in any legal sense (Rokumoto 1986, 228-9).
O engraçado é pensar que se a sociedade tem um sistema informal tão bom para resolver disputas, o custo de se ter advogados aumenta um bocado, tornando-os quase inúteis. A ironia? Bem, advogados já estabelecidos têm um incentivo para estimular a discórdia… ^_^