This paper shows in a Stackelberg differential game between editors and authors that academic networks neither affect the number of publications nor the quality of an author’s papers. Networks only affect the number of an author’s citations. Editor’s preferences for publishing an author because of her network membership seem irrelevant. This happens because editors compete to increase their journal’s reputation by publishing high quality papers. As a consequence, there appears to be no room for editorial bias. Further, increased competition among publishing outlets has the potential to erode the citation gains. Increases in publication benefits are shown to leave citations unaffected, increase the number of publications, and decrease research quality. The results generally carry through when the publishing markets tend to a monopoly structure.
Aqui na selva, diriam os autores deste artigo, o resultado empírico seria similar (ao previsto pela teoria)? Aposto que há alguém na blogosfera que falaria muito sobre isto. 🙂