Um mundo sem bancos centrais

Já citei a entrevista de Selgin aqui. Mas Arnold Kling tem outras ótimas observações sobre o problema. Especialmente em termos de sinalização. Vejamos:

The question I have is whether a system of government guarantees produces an overall higher level of economic growth. It could do so by giving people more confidence in financial intermediaries on average through time.

It could be that putting the symbol “FDIC insured” on the door of banks is a very inexpensive signaling mechanism with a lot of social benefits. It could be argued that without that signaling mechanism, financial intermediation would be much more costly than it is today.

I am not saying that this is definitely true. However, I do think that it is the key issue in banking theory. It is all about the costs and benefits, including moral hazard and regulatory costs, of different signaling mechanisms.

Observe que, o problema não é necessariamente ter ou não um banco central, mas sim a forma de sinalizar a reputação.


The Economist…s

Cada um com a sua moeda? Esta veio do Boing Boing:

Open Source Money There’s a lot of books emerging on the use of complementary and local currencies. I got a ton of email on this subject already, from people concerned that I’m referring to scrip or the kinds of currencies used in the US prior to the 1930’s. If the brilliant and free Bernard Latier text I recommended was too involved, there’s a book I’ve just been made aware of that looks at some of the more practical implications of creating a community money supply called Money: Understanding and Creating Alternatives to Legal Tender, by Thomas H. Greco. If you don’t have five bucks for the paperback, there’s an abridged PDF here.