Já citei a entrevista de Selgin aqui. Mas Arnold Kling tem outras ótimas observações sobre o problema. Especialmente em termos de sinalização. Vejamos:
The question I have is whether a system of government guarantees produces an overall higher level of economic growth. It could do so by giving people more confidence in financial intermediaries on average through time.
It could be that putting the symbol “FDIC insured” on the door of banks is a very inexpensive signaling mechanism with a lot of social benefits. It could be argued that without that signaling mechanism, financial intermediation would be much more costly than it is today.
I am not saying that this is definitely true. However, I do think that it is the key issue in banking theory. It is all about the costs and benefits, including moral hazard and regulatory costs, of different signaling mechanisms.
Observe que, o problema não é necessariamente ter ou não um banco central, mas sim a forma de sinalizar a reputação.