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Concorrência de moedas hayekiana funciona?

hayekdefeated

Acho que o melhor resumo do argumento teórico desfavorável ao otimismo hayekiano nunca foi tão bem resumido como por Hadba (1994). É, basicamente, o argumento de Milton Friedman.

Pode-se achar interessante o trabalho de Hayek sobre uma possível estrutura de mercado na qual há concorrência entre moedas (eu mesmo sempre destaquei a importância de se ler o pequeno livro dele).

Mas é fato que a lógica econômica não é tão favorável assim ao argumento hayekiano. Obviamente, qualquer crítica séria ao argumento acima precisa enfrentar a lógica simples pois: (a) não há como negar que a racionalidade econômica opere (Rmg = Cmg), (b) também não vejo a tecnologia mudando o fato de que o Cmg é praticamente zero na emissão de uma nota adicional. Logo, não há como escapar de (c). Caso haja, gostaria de ver o argumento.

Por falar nisto, como anda o tal bitcoin? Não vejo mais notícias sobre esta moeda como via antes o que, de certa forma, é supreendente para mim, já que estamos com uma inflação que, no mínimo, incentivaria seu maior uso (não vou dizer ceteris paribus a regulação do Banco Central porque sabemos que o pessoal sempre dá um jeito de burlar leis que vão contra as trocas voluntárias).

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História Monetária: o caso da Itália

História das instituições monetárias? Tudo bem! Que tal falar de competição entre bancos na criação de moedas?

Adverse clearings in a monetary system with multiple note issuers: the case of Italy (1861–1893)
Giuseppina Gianfreda, Fabrizio Mattesini

Abstract
We study the regime of multiple note issuers that characterized the Italian monetary system from the unification of Italy in 1861 to the creation of the Bank of Italy in 1893. We describe how the system evolved and we analyze how it functioned by studying the clearing of notes among banks. Since by law banknotes had to be redeemed at par, we focus on the ability of banks to keep notes in circulation before redemption. We estimate adverse clearings of notes issued by the dominant bank [Banca Nazionale degli Stati Sardi (BNS)] in the provinces where this bank had branches and we find that the entry of a smaller issuer limited the BNS’s capacity to keep its notes in circulation at the local level. We take this as evidence that competition in note issuance worked as an effective discipline device. Our results are consistent with the analysis of Pareto (Journal des économistes 3–28, 1893) who maintained that the fall of the Italian system was not due to the failure of the competitive mechanism, but rather to the altering of the rules of the game by the government.

Repare que o velho Pareto já havia estudado o mesmo tópico.

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Senhoriagem e Inflação, por David Romer

O trecho abaixo (nota de rodapé 28, lá no cap.11) mostra algo que eu sempre digo em sala: capital humano faz a diferença no combate à inflação.

Individuals who specialize in monetary policy are likely to be more knowledgeable about its effects. They are therefore likely to have more accurate estimates of the benefits and costs of expansionary policy. If incomplete knowledge of those costs and benefits leads to inflationary bias, increasing specialists’ role in determining policy is likely to reduce that bias.

Tá lá, na página 567!

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História do Pensamento Econômico Brasileiro: Regras e Discricionaridade

Pouca gente da área parece ter estudado todos os livros de história econômica (ou somente os de Celso Furtado). Digo isto porque uma frase como esta:

“Na perspectiva da História, parece que um sistema de regras, em vez de autoridade, teria promovido muito melhor todos os objetivos da Nação”. [Peláez, 1979, 121]

Jamais poderia ter parecido despercebida…

p.s. Quem, em 1979, debatia regras e discricionaridade no Brasil?

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Bancos…

“Strategic Online-Banking Adoption”
by Roberto Fuentes, Rubén Hernández-Murillo, and Gerard Llobet

In this paper we study the determinants of banks’ decision to adopt a transactional website for their customers. Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the period 2003-2006, we show that although bank-specific characteristics are important determinants of banks’ adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role. The extent of competition is related to the geographical overlap of banks in different markets and their relative market share in terms of deposits. In more competitive markets banks are more likely to adopt earlier. Even more importantly, banks adopt earlier in markets where their competitors have already adopted. In order to construct the different local markets, this paper is one of the first that makes use of the geographic market definitions delimited by the Cassidi® Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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Nem sempre o bom acadêmico é seguido pelo gestor

It is that the Fed seems to deny or misunderstand the importance of the type of rule-based policymaking that academics have in mind. This misunderstanding, furthermore, is currently contributing to the problems of “communication with the public” that the Fed has been experiencing, as recently reported in the WSJ by Ip (2003b).

Grifos meus. As consequências disto? Bem, eu diria que não é uma boa idéia seguir charlatães, mas o problema dos interesses políticos que se sobrepõem aos sociais (que são os econômicos, claro, já que ninguém gosta de ter que pagar mais impostos a um governante gastador e irresponsável e ficar com menos dinheiro pro almoço) não deve ser ignorado.

McCallum é autor do melhor livro de Economia Monetária (intermediário) que já vi.

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História Econômica Séria: O Padrão-Ouro

Eis um artigo muito interessante. Seu resumo:

Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? Lessons from Japan
By: Kris James Mitchener (Santa Clara University, UCLA and NBER)
Masato Shizume (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University)
Marc D. Weidenmier (Claremont McKenna College and NBER)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:228&r=his
Why did policymakers adopt the gold standard? Although previous research has identified ex post effects of gold standard adoption on trade and bond yields, few studies have sought to understand whether these were the actual outcomes of interest to policymakers at the time of adoption. We examine Japan’s adoption of the gold standard in 1897 to understand both the ex ante motives policymakers gave for wanting to go onto the gold standard and the ex post effects of gold standard adoption. By focusing on multiple outcome variables that were of interest to contemporaries, we are able to shed light on the political economy of the adoption of fixed exchange rates. In contrast to previous studies examining bond yields, we find little evidence that joining the gold standard reduced Japan’s country risk or that it resulted in a domestic investment boom. On the other hand, we find that membership in the gold standard increased bilateral trade flows. The boost in trade appears to have been largest between Japan and its trading partners on the silver standard, suggesting that the depreciation of gold against silver from 1897-1914 increased the competitiveness of Japanese exports.

Sim, sim, tem um teste econométrico simples.

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The Economist…s

Cada um com a sua moeda? Esta veio do Boing Boing:

Open Source Money There’s a lot of books emerging on the use of complementary and local currencies. I got a ton of email on this subject already, from people concerned that I’m referring to scrip or the kinds of currencies used in the US prior to the 1930’s. If the brilliant and free Bernard Latier text I recommended was too involved, there’s a book I’ve just been made aware of that looks at some of the more practical implications of creating a community money supply called Money: Understanding and Creating Alternatives to Legal Tender, by Thomas H. Greco. If you don’t have five bucks for the paperback, there’s an abridged PDF here.

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História da Política Monetária

Quem deseja escrever a história do sistema de metas de inflação moderno pode gostar disto:

“The Great Inflation: Did The Shadow Know Better?”
by William Poole, Robert H. Rasche, and David C. Wheelock

The Shadow Open Market Committee was formed in 1973 in response to rising inflation and the apparent unwillingness of U.S. policymakers to implement policies necessary to maintain price stability. This paper describes how the Committee’s policy views differed from those of most Federal Reserve officials and many academic economists at the time. The Shadow argued that price stability should be the primary goal of monetary policy, and favored gradual adjustment of monetary growth to a rate consistent with price stability. The paper evaluates the Shadow’s policy rule in the context of the New Keynesian macroeconomic model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Simulations of the model suggest that the gradual stabilization of monetary growth favored by the Shadow would have lowered inflation with less impact on output growth, and with less variability in output and inflation, than a one-time reduction in monetary growth. We conclude that the Shadow articulated a sensible policy that would have outperformed the policies actually implemented by the Federal Reserve during the Great Inflation era.

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Artigo que não será comentado na blogosfera…

…nem com o devido espaço e, no caso brasileiro, nem com o devido respeito.

Taylor Rule Under Financial Instability

Author/Editor: Bauducco, Sofia | Bulir, Ales | Cihák, Martin
Authorized for Distribution: January 1, 2008
Electronic Access: Free Full Text (PDF file size is 967KB)
Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file.

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Summary: This paper contributes to the analysis of monetary policy in the face of financial instability. In particular, we extend the standard new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices to include a financial system. Our simulations suggest that if financial instability affects output and inflation with a lag and if the central bank has privileged information about credit risk, monetary policy that responds instantly to increased credit risk can trade off more output and inflation instability today for a faster return to the trend than a policy that follows the simple Taylor rule with only the contemporaneous output gap and inflation.