When the famed Chilean author, Isabel Allende, had to leave her native country in the wake of the military coup against leftist president Salvador Allende in 1973, she and her family fled to the safety and stability of Venezuela, then a beacon among the tumult of Latin America. In a recent interview, Ms. Allende recounted,
“I went to Venezuela, because Venezuela was one of the very few democratic countries left in Latin America where you could go. … The country has all the resources. At the time when I went there in the ‘70s it was one of the richest countries in the world because of the oil boom. The problem, at that time, everything looked very abundant and there was a lot of corruption, but there was enough corruption for everybody.”
The contrast between Venezuela of the 1960s and 1970s – when it had a per capita GDP six times higher than Spain and was the first country in the world to be declared malaria-free – and today is a sober reminder that stability can be ephemeral.
(…) social and political trust are critical social achievements for sustaining a diverse social order, but social trust is more important than political trust. Second, liberal democratic market-institutions play a modest role in sustaining social trust, and a large role in sustaining political trust. We can conclude, then, that liberal-democratic market societies are part of a positive causal feedback loop that sustain trusting social orders with diverse persons who disagree.
Outro ponto ótimo para se refletir:
Some argue that political trust is declining in many North American and Western European nations due to rising inequality and various widely observed events and governmental failures, such as Watergate or other corruption scandals. Others argue that as people grow richer and more educated they become more discerning observers of political events, and come to have higher expectations of democracy. “At the same time that people have become less trustful of government,” Russell Dalton of the University of California at Irvine has written, “other opinion surveys show continued and widespread attachment to democracy and its ideals, which may have strengthened in recent decades.”
Pense nisso, por exemplo, em nível municipal. Cidades que possuem diferentes indicadores de confiança social (social trust) e de confiança na política (political trust) poderiam também ser cidades com diferentes graus de emporiofobia.
Mais ainda: como as cidades não foram fundadas na mesma data, cada uma delas se encontra, ceteris paribus, em momentos diferentes de suas histórias. Cidades muito novas podem ter baixo grau de rent-seeking, por exemplo. Contudo, seu potencial pró-mercado pode sofrer com a ação de grupos de interesse olsonianos ao longo do tempo.
Sim, como quase todos os fenômenos sociais, também os níveis de confiança e outras variáveis compartilham de uma endogenia (se é que posso dizer dessa forma…) que dificulta bastante os estudos na área.
Nada que não mereça um pouco mais de leitura e reflexão, claro.
Em instantes, incluída a V-Dem, índice de variedades de democracia nos links laterais, sob o título (óbvio!) “Base de Dados”
Karol Bodreaux pensa que sim. Uma nota pessoal: ao invés desta baboseira de politicamente correto (história “afro-descendente”) ou de ONG’s voltadas para a pregação stalinist..digo, socialista como saída para a África, acho muito mais interessante a visão de se pensar instituições para que o potencial empreendedor dos africanos seja a luz no fim do túnel.
Isto não exclui o microcrédito – meus leitores mais antigos sabem que enterrei uma pequena quantia no Kiva, lá na África – mas microcrédito não é, repito, a saída. A saída é a mudança das regras do jogo que, inclusive, englobam o microcrédito.
Uma cultura desenvolvida é resultado de instituições sólidas ou instituições sólidas são resultado de uma cultura desenvolvida.
Na verdade nem se trata de dilema algum.
É claro que culturas desenvolvidas geram instituições sólidas.
E culturas atrasadas geram as aberrações que vemos diariamente nas páginas dos nossos jornais. A única semelhança que nossas instituições, em todos os níveis, guardam com as dos países dsenvolvidos é no nome.
O último número do The World Bank Research Observer está muito bom. Por exemplo, o famoso Dixit abre o último número:
This article offers a provocative critique of the ability of research on the impact of institutions on growth to offer immediate and practical recommendations for reforming and redesigning institutions in developing countries and transition economies. The literature traces the sources of growth to unalterable historical and geographic features. It contains equally plausible recommendations for opposite courses of action. It is sometimes driven by fads or recommends imitation of the latest success story. Some recommendations are too vague or too general to constitute practical advice. The article suggests a Bayesian diagnostic procedure to identify the causes of economic failure in an individual country as a first step toward remedying the failure.
A resposta vem em seguida, pelas mãos de Philip Keefer.
Veja o (longo) resumo deste texto:
The importance of the institutional framework for economic development is widely accepted today and it is duly stressed in the economic literature. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and an efficient legal system are the pillars of the contemporary rule of law. However, formal institutions cannot function without being internalized by the citizens and without the backing of social norms. Morality and social norms are the major elements of the informal institutional structure, the social capital, which is also critical for social welfare and economic development. In this paper we will discuss both the formal and the informal institutional framework of Ancient Athens, which was a free market society with economic problems similar to contemporary market societies. Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes. Such an institutional framework functioned effectively, cultivating trust and protecting the security of transactions. This entire system however was based on social norms such as reciprocity, the value of reputation and business ethics. Conformity to social norms as well as moral behavior was fostered by social-sanction mechanisms (such as stigma) and moral education. The Athenian example is a further proof of the importance of morality and social norms as transaction cost-saving devices even in quite sophisticated legal systems. Their absence or decline leads inevitably to the need for more regulation, clear-cut rules, less judicial discretionary power and more litigation. Athenian law was pioneering in the development of rules and institutional mechanisms suitable for the reduction of transaction costs, many of them surviving in the most complex contemporary legal systems.
O nome do texto? Fácil. Se você checou o link acima verá que é : “Morality, Social Norms and Rule of Law as Transaction Cost-Saving Devices: The Case of Ancient Athens”.