Embora os dois artigos a seguir não se digam como na área de Sports Economics, eles são totalmente compatíveis com a agenda de pesquisa que segue – paradoxalmente – pouco apreciada e conhecida por aqui.
The Announcement Impact of Hosting the FIFA World Cup on Host Country Stock Markets
This study is an investigation of the impact of hosting the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament on the stock market of the host country when the tournament is announced. The sample under examination for this study consists of the 5 FIFA World Cups, between the period 1994 and 2010. Additional factors to be assessed include investigating whether stock markets react efficiently or show a positive reaction to hosting the FIFA World Cup. An event study research methodology is used to investigate the impact of hosting the FIFA World Cup on the stock exchange of the host country, by examining the movement of stock market returns across various event windows during the announcement and tournament starting date stages.
It is found that country stock markets react differently to the announcement of the tournament. For instance South Africa appears to show a positive trend in stock returns at the tournament announcement date, while Japan shows a decline in daily stock returns a day after the announcement of the tournament. It is found that for the tournament announcement, most countries show insignificant negative cumulative abnormal stock returns for different event windows. There are however few instances where country stock markets do show positive cumulative abnormal stock returns, with statistical significant results. The implication of this study is that FIFA World Cups have varied impacts on host country stock markets. This study contributes to the understanding of the impacts of mega sporting events on host country stock markets, with specific reference to the FIFA World Cup.
O segundo é o: Does the World Cup get the economic ball rolling? Evidence from a synthetic control approach
In this paper we analyze the impact of hosting the FIFA Soccer World Cup on GDP per capita in a worldwide sample of countries using a transparent statistical methodology for data-driven case studies the synthetic control method. Using country level annual-data covering all events occurring in the period between 1978 (Argentina) and 2006 (Germany), we show that the estimated average treatment effectwas either zero or negative for all but one of the countries analyzed. Our results, therefore, support the general claim that World Cups are not statistically associated to development and economic growth.
Segundo as conclusões deste estudo de 2017 cuja amostra são as escolas públicas brasileiras:
Based on the theoretical propositions and the empirical evidence, educational policies in Brazil should pay special attention to the managerial aspects of school units. In this study, the prominent role of school managers in developing organizational structures to support teaching and learning can be observed in the positive correlation between the level of proficiency in the school’s mathematics and the IME, particularly in schools with the worst levels of proficiency. Therefore, it is extremely important to adapt the existing signaling mechanisms – fluid educational goals instead of goals designed by information at the starting point on proficiency level and a shorter delay in data collection on educational performance, among other things – or to create new mechanisms that act to reduce problems such as moral hazard.
Ah sim, outro resultado interessante é que um diretor de escola, ao atingir a meta de desempenho estabelecida, passa a apresentar esforço marginal decrescente. Nada que não se esperasse…
Eis o anúncio seguido do link para o artigo.
The fifth annual Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Prize has been awarded to Anna Gunderson, Ph.D. student in political science at Emory University (www.annagunderson.com), for her paper “Why do States Privatize Their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation”.
The Ostrom Prize is awarded each year to the single best combined paper and presentation by a graduate student at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society. The Prize carries a commemorative plaque and $1,000 honorarium sponsored by The Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University. 2019 is the fifth year for the Ostrom Prize.
Gunderson’s paper was selected as one of three finalists among a field of approximately 20 entries, and then presented on a special session at the 56thAnnual Meetings of the Public Choice Society, March 14-16 in Louisville, Kentucky. Her entry was selected as the winner by a panel of six judges.
“This year’s field of entries was excellent,” President Roger Congleton said, “and the selection committee had a difficult decision to make.”
Ah sim, o artigo.
Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been an unintended consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government.
Observing monkeys biting each other, Bateson remarked that they were “engaged in an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to but not the same as those of combat” (1955/1972a, p. 152; emphasis added). That is, to a casual observer or a poorly socialized monkey (if there were such a creature), the same actions might be taken as either fight- ing or playing. Bateson reasoned that the monkeys must have some way of signaling to each other—some form of “meta-communication”—that enabled them to discern which of the two modes was afoot. They were, in other words, “framing” their actions to signal either fight-biting or play-biting. [VAN HULST, M.; YANOW, D. From Policy “Frames” to “Framing”. The American Review of Public Administration, v. 46, n. 1, p. 92–112, 2014]
Talvez este pequeno artigo seja a e-nésima evidência de que falta de dados não é desculpa. Pode demorar, mas você encontra dados. Erros de medida estão inclusos no pacote, fazem parte do jogo.
Economistas de boa formação acadêmica e profissional não discordam sobre isso. Mas Marize coloca um outro ponto de vista, vindo das Ciências Sociais.
Dica do Leo Monasterio. Ainda me lembro de ler o working paper disso.
Uma das lições é que não se deve idolatrar pesquisadores, por melhores que sejam. Muita gente ainda desconhece os problemas apontados pelo David Albouy.
P.S. outra lição é que você deve investir um bom tempo na base de dados.
Este pequeno artigo de Shepsle, homenageando Arrow, tem alguma intuição interessante sobre o valor presente de obras como as barragens que, infelizmente, causaram grandes tragédias.
Em resumo, o resultado de Arrow-Lind é que a taxa de desconto intertemporal não precisaria considerar aspectos de aversão ao risco quando o projeto em questão envolve uma grande quantidade de indivíduos. Nas palavras do autor:
The intuition is that as n gets large the utility function of an individual, whatever her risk preferences, becomes approximately linear in the (shrinking) range of possible outcomes, thus rendering her approximately risk neutral. The implication for public projects is that the flow of net benefits needs to be discounted only for time and not for risk. The present value of a public project is just the sum of expected values discounted for time.
Mas, e aí vem a reflexão do próprio Shepsle: esta conclusão não seria válida para bens públicos. A intuição é que, para bens públicos, os benefícios não são divisíveis (lembra da sua aula de Economia do Setor Público?), como suposto no raciocínio que leva ao resultado de Arrow-Lind. Afinal, no rompimento de uma represa (ou barragem de detritos):
Everyone sinks or swims together.
Assim, não custa lembrar este nosso artigo sobre clássicos e mando de campo.
Mestrandos em Ciências Econômicas de uma certa universidade precisam ter um Índice de Aproveitamento Global (IAG), na pior das hipóteses, de 3 (três). Como é a sua maximização de utilidade? É mais ou menos assim.
Uma sequência de músicas que se seguiram ao 11/03/2011, nos mais diversos estilos.
A animação lembra muito os traços do divertido Archer. A econometria de Angrist é muito popular por estes dias. Nunca é demais lembrar que os contrafactuais entraram na Ciência Econômica pelos trabalhos de Robert Fogel, em História Econômica. Também não é demais lembrar que há um debate interessante sobre a econometria com participantes pesos pesados.