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Pague-me para emagrecer!

Seu amigo pterodoxo tá gordinho? Aposto que ele emagrece ganhando uns trocados, mesmo que fale mal da racionalidade…

Sabe aquele seu amigo que acha os dez princípios da economia enunciados no livro-texto (que muito pterodoxo não leu, sequer, até a metade) do Mankiw? Pois é. Olha aí.

Small cash rewards for big losers : experimental insights into the fight against the obesity epidemic (English)

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the sustainability of weight loss achieved through cash rewards and, for the first time, the potential of monetary incentives to prevent weight cycling. In a three period randomized controlled trial, about 700 obese persons were assigned to two treatment groups, which were promised different cash rewards contingent on the achievement of an individually assigned target weight, and to a control group. Successful participants were subsequently allocated to two treatment groups offered different monetary incentives for maintaining the previously achieved target weight and to a control group. This is the first experiment of this kind that finds sustainable effects of weight loss rewards on the body weight of the obese even 18 months after the rewards were removed. Additional incentives to maintain an achieved body weight improve the sustainability of weight loss only while are in place

Show de bola, não? Ah sim, um trecho da conclusão (onde ele discute problemas, inclusive o da validação externa…sobre o qual falei em sala, ahá, hoje).

Our experiment shows that financial incentives can have positive and sustainable effects on weight reduction of obese individuals and, hence, may be an effective measure to fight the obese pandemic. According to our results, however, it appears to be important to announce monetary rewards well in advance. Different to the effect of monetary incentives to lose weight, we are not able to provide a clear answer concerning the effects of financial incentives to sustain a certain body weight. At the end of the experiment, individuals who received both incentives for weight loss and incentives to maintain a lower body weight are neither better nor worse off than individuals who received only a weight‐loss reward.

Eu reconheço: minha aula de Econometria III é muito boa! Sem falsa modéstia porque sei bem o meu valor. ^_^

p.s. para uma definição de pterodoxo (termo que eu cunhei, há anos), pesquise este blog.

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Seu padrão de “cliques” na internet é racional, consumidor?

É. Duvida? Dá uma olhada nisto. Olha o resumo:

We study users’ responses to sponsored-search advertising using consumer-level data from Microsoft Live. We document that users click ads in a nonsequential order and that the click through rates depend on the identity of competing ads. We estimate a dynamic model of utility-maximizing users that rationalizes these two facts and find that 51 percent more clicks would occur if ads faced no competition. We demonstrate that optimal matching of advertisements to positions raises welfare by 27 percent, and that individual-level targeting raises welfare by 69 percent. Revealing the quality of the advertiser prior to clicking on a sponsored link raises welfare by 1.6 percent. (JEL D12, L86, M37) [Jeziorski, Przemyslaw, and Ilya Segal. 2015. “What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3): 24-53.]

Muito bom para jogar na cara de quem duvida da racionalidade do consumidor, né?

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Incentivos importam? O caso das leis de divórcio e o consumo

Incentivos importam? Bem, vejam este estudo.

Voena, Alessandra. 2015. “Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?” American Economic Review, 105(8): 2295-2332.
Abstract

This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples’ intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed an equal division of property is associated with higher household savings and lower female employment, implying a distortion in household assets accumulation and a transfer toward wives whose share in household resources is smaller than the one of their husband. When spouses share consumption equally, separate property or prenuptial agreements can reduce distortions and increase equity. (JEL D13, D14, D91, J12, J16, K36)

Eu falava, hoje, em uma aula introdutória, sobre o papel dos incentivos. Bem, nada mais ilustrativo…