Federalismo e Restrição Orçamentária Frouxa

Political Economy of Multi – Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries:Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax AutonomyAuthor/Editor: Ahmad, Ehtisham | Brosio, Giorgio
Authorized for Distribution: March 1, 2008
Electronic Access: Free Full Text (PDF file size is 512KB)
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Summary: A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.

Nos tempos atuais, creio, mais do que nunca é importante discutir estas questões. Eu gosto muito do estudo de soft budget constraint, embora esteja um pouco distante do tema há uns 10 anos, com periódicos intervalos devidos a alguns insistentes alunos com seus temas de monografia. Mas recomendo o texto a qualquer um que se interesse por federalismo fiscal, federalismo ou o famoso federalismo preservador de mercados (google it, pal!)