Corrupção · Desenvolvimento econômico · liberdade

Ladrão bom é ladrão rico?

This article adds to the empirical literature on the relationship between corruption and economic growth by incorporating the impact of economic freedom. We utilize an econometric model with two improvements on the previous literature: (1) our model accounts for the fact that economic growth, corruption, and investment are jointly determined, and (2) we include economic freedom explicitly as an explanatory variable. Using a panel of 60 countries, we find that for countries with low economic freedom (where individuals have limited economic choices), corruption reduces economic growth. However, in countries with high economic freedom, corruption is found to increase economic growth. Our results contradict the generally accepted view that corruption lowers the rate of growth.

Leia mais aqui.

humor negro · off-topic

Como conseguir paz mundial?

1. Junte uns amigos brucutus,

2. Encha suas mentes de um discurso socialista com toques cristãos (CNBB + Marx + Gramsci + etc),

3. Mate alguns e sequestre outros,

4. Crie um imenso estoque de quase-mortos, sequestrados. Mantenha-os em regime de isolamento e com pouca comida,

5. Cultive a produção de drogas e diga que é pelo “social”,

6. Negocie um décimo dos reféns com qualquer um que esteja disposto a lhe dar o “status” de organização não-governamental (embora você seja, no mínimo, um terrorista e, no máximo, um criminoso violento),

7. Pronto, você já tem a fórmula para a paz mundial.

Desenvolvimento econômico · nova economia institucional

Outro bom artigo

Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited CompaniesTIMOTHY W. GUINNANE
Yale University – Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Tel Aviv University – Buchmann Faculty of Law
University of California, Los Angeles – Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
University of California, Los Angeles – Department of Economics December 2007

Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 959
We use the history of private limited liability companies (PLLCs) to challenge two pervasive assumptions in the literature: (1) Anglo-American legal institutions were better for economic development than continental Europe’s civil-law institutions; and (2) the corporation was the superior form of business organization. Data on the number and types of firms organized in France, Germany, the UK, and the US show that that the PLLC became the form of choice for small- and medium-size enterprises wherever and whenever it was introduced. The PLLC’s key advantage was its flexible internal governance rules that allowed its users to limit the threat of untimely dissolution inherent in partnerships without taking on the full danger of minority oppression that the corporation entailed. The PLLC was first successfully introduced in Germany, a code country, in 1892. Great Britain, a common-law country followed in 1907, and France, a code country, in 1925. The laggard was the US, a common-law country whose courts had effectively killed earlier attempts to enact the form.