This paper investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To e¤ectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conict, and maximize piratical pro t. I argue that pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances that crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conict and create piratical law and order. Remarkably, pirates adopted both of these institutions before the United States or England. Pirate governance created su¢ cient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.
Não sei não, mas este artigo tem um jeitão que, creio, agradaria o Fábio Pesavento… 🙂